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CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE
CORRECTIONAL HALFWAY
HOUSE SETTING
n Kansas v. Kenney,' A DISTRICT STATE COURT of Kansas held the director of a
state-funded community-based correctional facility (the Manhattan
House) in contempt of court for refusing to answer questions relating to
communications between himself and residents of the program. Pursuant to a
state statute, the county attorney initiated a drug inquisition, subsequently
calling the director, Kenney, as a witness. Kenney was granted immunity and
questioned regarding his general knowledge of drug activities in the county.
When questions were propounded relating to information obtained from
communications with residents, Kenney refused to answer. He claimed that
the information was "privileged" in as much as it was gained subsequent to a
guarantee of confidentiality extended by him to the residents. As a result of the
contempt ruling, Kenney was to be confined in jail until he purged himself of
contempt.
An appeal was filed by Kenney, during which time the Manhattan House
was applying for renewal of program funding. The state funding agency
informed the Board of Directors of the Manhattan House that refunding
would not likely be forthcoming unless the director either answered the
questions or "temporarily" resigned. The Board indicated that unless Kenney
remained as director they would formally withdraw their application for
refunding. Kenney remained as director and the refunding application was
denied.
During the next year, a new county attorney was elected and, following a
motion by the defendant's attorney to dismiss the appeal, the new county
attorney informed the court that he had no interest in pursuing the matter and
the case was dismissed entirely.
The outcome of this situation exemplifies the potential threat posed by the
absence of legal protection of communications between the residents and
staff of community-based correctional programs. Without legal protection,
one of three undesirable results will occur when the issue is confronted in the
courtroom: 1) the resident who, in good faith, communicated self-
incriminating evidence to the staff will be incriminated, 2) an existing
program will be terminated, or 3) the therapeutic process of a program will
be abridged. Thus, a court's ruling in this matter could ultimately thwart the
implementations of the philosophies and goals upon which community-based
correctional programs are founded.
The author proposes that a legal testimonial privilege regarding
confidential communications between the staff and residents of community-
based correctional programs is necessary to insure the integrity of the
therapeutic process and, ultimately, the success of the program itself. This
note will examine the role of community-based correctional programs and the
law in regard to testimonial privileges and will demonstrate that the extension
of the privilege in this setting is legally appropriate.
I Kansas v. Kenney, No. 2668 (D. Kan. May 23, 1974).
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I. THE HALFWAY HOUSE - A COMMUNITY-BASED
CORRECTIONAL PROGRAM
Halfway houses or community treatment centers perform a wide variety
of diverse functions. The target populations of the various halfway houses and
community treatment centers in existence today include: "the psychiatric
patient, the neglected child, the delinquent child. . . , the adult public
offender - both misdemeanant and felon -. . . , the homeless adult with
social or adjustment problems, and individuals with specialized problems
such as drug abuse, alcoholism and mental retardation." 2 The scope of this
note is limited to a discussion of those halfway houses which operate to serve
adult felons and misdemeanants. Unless otherwise specified, the term
halfway house or correctional halfway house will be utilized to describe those
programs which serve adult felons or misdemeanants.
A. The Historical Emergence of the Correctional Halfway House
A proposal was submitted to the Massachusetts State legislature in 1817,
recommending the establishment of a transitional "shelter" for the released
offender to serve as a stepping stone for those re-entering the mainstream of
society.3 The proposal, for what would later come to be known as a "halfway
house" facility, was rejected, and it was not until the 1960's that another such
formal proposal was made. 4 However, during the interim, a number of
privately operated halfway houses came into existence through the efforts of
religious and humanistically-oriented volunteer groups. 5
In the early 1960's the most significant advancement of the halfway house
development occurred as the result of two significant events: first, the
emergence of an era of cooperation between the halfway house ad-
ministrators and the parole boards regarding parole placement; second, a
shift in ideology by the halfway house personnel from what was previously
simply a humanitarian philosophy to one which incorporated a correction
treatment theme.6 In 1964 the International Halfway House Association was
formed. 7 A few years later the Safe Streets and Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968 was passed and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(L.E.A.A.) was created. 9 The L.E.A.A. greatly aided the correctional halfway
house cause by providing federal funding through state agencies to those
interested in implementing a halfway house program. I0
2 J. MCCARTT & T. MANGOGNA, GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR HALFWAY HOUSES AND
COMMUNITY TREATMENT CENTERS 6 (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, L.E.A.A. 1973).
3 Beha, Halfway Houses in Adult Corrections: The Law, Practice, and Results, 11 CRIM L.
BULL. 434, 438 (1975).
4 Id. at 442.
5 See J. MCCARTr & T. MANCOCNA, supra note 2, at 1, 2,4. The authors cite the founding of St.
Leonard's House, Dismas House, and 308 West Residence as being responsible for the revival of
the movement. ld. at 4. See also N. BERAN, H. BOWMAN, E. CARLSON, J. GRANDFIELD, & R. SErrER,
HALFWAY HOUSES (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, L.E.A.A. 1977) [hereinafter cited as SErrER].
6 Beba, supra note 3, at 444.
7 J. MCCARTr & T. MANCOCNA, supra note 2, at 5.
8 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (1976).
9 Beha, supra note 3, at 5.
I6 SErrER, supra note5, at 1. The report states that from the beginning of the L.E.A.A. until July
of 1975, $24,837,512 of federal monies were matched with $12,300,710 of private and/or state
monies to fund 348 grants to support residential inmate aftercare programs for adults.
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It should be noted that during this time a movement was also underway in
the field of corrections which sought to implement community-based
alternatives to the "institutionalization" of offenders. A two year study
conducted by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice resulted in a report being published in 1967 in which
the Commission recommended that "correctional authorities should develop
more extensive community programs providing special, intensive treatment
as an alternative to institutionalization for both juvenile and adult offenders."'"
This report was the impetus for the Safe Streets and Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1968 and for the commitment of federal monies that followed. The
correctional halfway house has become a key part in the recent shift toward
community-based corrections.
B. Types of Clients Served
Although correctional halfway house programs initially were imple-
mented to serve the released offender, today the halfway house model has
been adopted to assist individuals at various stages along the criminal justice
process.
1. Re-Integration
Re-integration is the traditional function of the correctional halfway
house. The idea is to provide a decompression chamber for those who have
been incarcerated and to assist the individual in re-integrating into the
mainstream of society. 2 The recipients of this focus include: the mandatory
releasee (released because his/her term has expired and who is no longer
under the legal control of the court or the state), the pre-releasee (transferred
to a halfway house prior to the time for mandatory release or parole), and the
parolee (conditionally released before his/her sentence term has expired and
who has been placed under the supervision of a parole officer).13
2. Alternative to Incarceration or Straight Probation
In recent years, those in the field of corrections have looked for
alternatives to incarceration which the courts might have available at their
disposal when confronted with the sentencing decision. 4 The alternative
sentencing philosophy and the shift in corrections to a community-based
orientation have prompted many halfway house organizations to accept
persons who are placed on probation. These programs provide additional
supervision for those who would be a probation risk and who, in the opinion
of the court, do not need the intense custodial environment of a prison.
3. Diversion - Pre-Conviction Disposition
An extension of the alternative sentencing philosophy mentioned above is
"l PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 171 (1967).
12 E. MILLER & R. MONTILLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 214 (1977).
1 Beba, supra note 3, at 448.
14 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS (TASK
FORCE ON CORRECTIONS), CORRECTIONS 569-70 (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, L.E.A.A. 1973). Standard
16.8 provides a list of sentencing alternatives (including referral to a halfway house) with the
recommendation that each state enact the proposed legislation.
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the practice of diverting the individual from the criminal justice process prior
to an actual adjudication of the case. Thus, at some point after arrest but prior
to conviction, the judge, under the law of the state, will refer the individual to
a halfway house as a ward of the court. Upon successful completion of the
program, the charges against the individual will be dismissed. 15
It should be noted that, in practice, some halfway houses are a hybrid of
the above-described models, operating to serve a mixed population. This is
particularly true where the halfway house is located in a geographical area in
which population size makes this an economic necessity.
C. Organization and Operation of Correctional
Halfway House Programs
The typical correctional halfway house operates to serve anywhere from
ten to thirty residents.16 The staff includes a director, assistant director, live-in
counselors (usually two), cook, and secretary (usually part-time). 17 The
program is generally initiated by a group of citizens who incorporate and
ultimately serve as the board of directors pursuant to the articles of
incorporation and by-laws.' 8 In addition, a board of trustees is sometimes
utilized to lend the program the credibility needed to elicit community
involvement. Community involvement is a key aspect of the correctional
halfway house inasmuch as one of its major functions is that of directing the
resident to the variety of resources existing in the community.' 9 Thus, every
successful program includes in its organizational strategy the available
resources within the macro-environment.
While referral to available community resources is an important feature of
the program, of no less importance is the in-program counseling provided to
the residents by the staff. The type of counseling offered will depend in part on
the philosophical preferences of the board of directors who presumably
engage the services of persons who are similarly inclined. The treatment
models which are most often adopted in the correctional halfway house
setting are: counseling and advocacy, psychoanalytic treatment, guided
group interaction, therapeutic community, reality therapy, and differential
treatment.2 0 The ultimate aim of all these models, in whatever variation, is to
aid the resident in a process of internalizing the norms of society to the extent
that he/she will want to conform to the laws upon his/her completion of the
program (usually ninety days). In addition to the socio-psychological
counseling, the resident is usually provided with financial, vocational and
educational counseling. Thus, correctional halfway house programs propose
to provide an environment which precipitates self-change while at the same
time directing the resident to needed community resources. All this occurs
within a structured setting whereby the resident learns to operate within the
framework of the rules and regulations established by the staff.
,5 Beha, supra note 3, at 451.
16 1 D. THALHEIMER, COST ANALYSIS OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS: HALFWAY HousEs 8 (U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, L.E.A.A. 1975).
11 Id. at 9.
18 J. MCCABTT & T. MANGOGNA, supra note 2, at 77.
19 Beha, supra note 3, at 459.
20 Id.
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D. Present Status of the Correctional Halfway House Movement
There are currently four hundred correctional halfway house programs
serving approximately ten thousand offenders. 21 The vast majority of these
programs have come into existence since 1965.22 What is even more amazing is
that if these programs operated at full capacity, the number of offenders
served would at least triple.
23
Correctional halfway houses are still being funded primarily by public
financial resources. These include "block funds from L.E.A.A., H.E.W. or
state planning agencies, contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons and
Division of Probation, state departments of corrections, and probation and
parole authorities."2 4 The large expenditures of tax dollars in this area has
prompted the establishment of the Commission on Accreditation for
Corrections. This Commission has published a Manual of Standards for Adult
Community Residential Services.25 These standards are the yardstick for the
Commission in its determinations regarding accreditation of a given program.
Accreditation by the Commission is essential inasmuch as it is a prerequisite
for federal and ultimately state contract agreements.2 6
The International Halfway House Association (I.H.H.A.) was formed in
1964. It has provided the correctional halfway house movement with the
means for national unification, and in addition it publishes a newsletter,
handbooks, and a directory of halfway houses. Furthermore, I.H.H.A.
conducts workshops and training seminars, as well as providing consultant
services and hosting national and international conferences.
While the present status of the correctional halfway house movement
suggests the "arrival" of correctional halfway house programs, ultimately the
programs must be judged in terms of how they measure up to claims made by
their proponents. The three most common arguments advanced by
supporters of correctional halfway houses are first, that these programs
provide a more humane method of dealing with the problem of crime,
second, that the cost of a community-based correctional program is
significantly less than that of a more intense custodial institution, and finally, it
is asserted that the recidivism rate is significantly lower for those released
from correctional halfway houses than it is for those released directly from an
institution. 27 Obtaining reliable evaluations from the programs so that an
actual comparison could be made as to the cost differential and the recidivism
rates has been a problem.28 However, in 1977, the National Institute of Law
21 SErTER, supra note 5, at ix.
22 Beha, supra note 3, at 435.
23 SErrER, supra note 5, at ix. The occupancy rules vary from a low of 21% of capacity to a high
of 76%. "If halfway houses were to operate at full capacity, a projected 30,000 to 40,000 offenders
could be served each year." Id.
24 D. THALHEIMER, supra note 16, at 7. In fiscal year 1973, 26% of the total released federal
population participated in community-based programs, while in fiscal year 1976 the percentage
increased to 54%. The projection for fiscal year 1979 and thereon is 65%. Interview with Gerald
Farkas, Northeast Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons, International Halfway House
Association News, June-August 1977, at 3, col. 3.
25 International Halfway House Association News, June-August 1977, at 2, col. 1.
26 Id.
27 Beha, supra note 3, at 454-62.
28 Id: at 473.
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Enforcement and Criminal Justice published a national evaluation of
correctional halfway houses. The following summarizes the findings:
• . . it appears that halfway houses are meeting several important
goals. One is economy. At full capacity, halfway houses cost no more
- and probably less - than incarceration in jail or prison, even
though they provide more services. They are at least as effective as
other forms of release, and probably more so. There is some
evidence that halfway houses do reduce the recidivism rates of
former residents, compared to ex-offenders released directly into the
community. Halfway house residents also seem to be more
successful in locating employment, although not necessarily in
maintaining it after release. Finally, community security and
property values do not seem to be jeopardized by the presence of a
halfway house. 29
These findings acknowledge the present importance of the halfway house
program in the American correctional system and should provide an added
impetus for even greater national and state government commitment in this
area in the future.
Today, correctional halfway house programs perform a vital function in
providing an alternative for both the offender and the corrections system at
various stages of the criminal justice system. These programs serve the larger
interests of society through the rehabilitation of the offender. Com-
munications between staff and residents of community-based correctional
programs must be protected if the goals and philosophies of such programs
are to be implemented.
II. CuRnRENT TESTIMONIAL PHIVILEGES
A. Background Considerations
The law, in its desire to foster certain confidential relationships, has seen fit
to protect the communications of persons in such relationships by designating
their communications as privileged against compelled disclosure in court.30
Authority for this testimonial protection may arise out of common law or
statutory enactment. These privileged communications are excluded from
evidence notwithstanding the fact that justice is deemed best served when all
the relevant facts are made available during the course of litigation.31
Testimonial privileges differ from other exclusionary rules in that the latter
group arises out of a recognition that certain evidence tends to hinder the
ascertainment of truth.32 Privileged communications are for the most part
reliable evidence which is excluded because, although it would aid the search
for truth, it would at the same time do significant damage to the confidential
relationships which the law deems worthy of protection.33
29 SErrER, supra note 5, at ix.
30 3 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 21.1 (6th ed. 1972).
31 Id.
32 The hearsay rule, for example, is aimed at excluding evidence which is difficult or
impossible to examine for reliability.
33 R. WEINBERG, CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS (1967).
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It is precisely the loss of such reliable evidence which has led some legal
scholars to heavily criticize the recognition of testimonial privileges at all.
34
But many others in the legal field have resisted efforts to cut back on
testimonial privileges, asserting that the right of privacy and security in
confidential relationships are more valuable than the convenience of those
engaged in litigation.3
5
Before any communications are deemed worthy of protection from
compelled disclosure, there are four canons which must first be satisfied. As
listed in Professor Wigmore's treatise on evidence, the canons are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would happen to the relation by disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation. 36
It is generally accepted that any testimonial privilege, whether recognized at
common law or enacted by statute, must meet the conditions of these canons.
In fact, any person asserting a testimonial privilege must show the court that
his/her situation in fact meets these conditions. 37
Whether the courts should be permitted to independently recognize a
confidential communication as privileged has been the subject of debate for
more than a century.38 Until recently, instances of independent recognition by
a court of a testimonial privilege have been rare.39 However, Rule 501 of the
34 8 J. WICMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (discussion of "public's right to
everyman's evidence"). "When the course of justice requires the investigation of the truth, no man
has any knowledge that is rightly private." Dubois v. Gibbons, 2111. 2d 392,416,118 N.E.2d 295,
308 (1954).
35 C. McCoaMIC, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77 (2d ed. 1972); see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S.
263, 292 (1929) (right to be exempt from unreasonable inquiries and disclosures with respect to
personal and private affairs); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (wiretapping); Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275,281 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Edgerton,
J., concurring) (communication made in reasonable confidence that it will not be disclosed).
3 8 J. WimMOR, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
37 See, e.g., Re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Fam. Ct. 1969) (holding that
communications by a mother to a social worker were not privileged because there was no
evidence that the communications between the mother and the certified social worker originated
in the confidence that they would not be disclosed); see also Lindsey v. People, 66 Colo. 343, 181
P. 531, appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 255 U.S. 560 (1919). In Lindsey, a boy's
statement to a juvenile court judge that he killed his father was not a privileged communication
during the trial of his mother for murder of the father. The court held that the benefit to be gained
by the correct disposition of the litigation was greater than any injury that could inure to the
relation by disclosure of the communication. Thus, the communication was not privileged under
Wigmore's fourth canon.
38 C. MCCORMICK, LAw OF EVIDENCE § 77 (2d ed. 1972). The development of judge-made
privileges virtually halted a century ago. In more recent times, the attitude of commentators,
whether from the bench, the bar, or the schools, has tended to view privileges from the standpoint
of the hindrance to litigation resulting from their recognition. Id.
31 See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 277-80 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring).
Judge Fahy argued for recognition of clergyman-pentinent privilege, even though the privilege is
not supported by either common law or statutory law. The majority never reached the issue. Cf.
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new Federal Rules of Evidence allows the federal courts to independently
recognize such privileges.40 Weinstein's Evidence4 1 highlights three salient
features of the rule as amended by Congress. First, the common law
privileges as well as statutory and constitutional privileges are to be applied.
Second, the federal courts are given authority to continue to develop existing
privileges, as well as formulate new privileges on a case by case basis. Finally,
under specified circumstances, state privileges are recognized. 42 Thus, the
Congress of the United States has given the federal courts the authority to test
current confidential relationships against the general principles that common
law judges relied upon.41
It is important to note, however, that in civil, non-federal question cases,
the federal courts are limited to applying the appropriate state law regarding
any sought-after privilege.44 But, in a federal question case, not only are the
federal courts free to recognize a privilege where no recognition is provided
for under state law or rule, they may properly refuse to protect confidential
communications which are recognized by the state court as being privi-
leged.45
State courts have, with few exceptions, exercised complete judicial
restraint in cases where a sought-after privilege did not already exist at
common law or by way of statutory enactment. 46 Recently, however, the
New Mexico supreme court has taken the unconventional position that
privileges are procedural rather than substantive in nature and as such are
subject to the domain of the New Mexico state courts and not the state
legislature. 47
State v. Evans, 104 Ariz. 434,454 P.2d 976 (1969) (holding that although there was no privilege by
way of statutory enactment and the physician-patient privilege was inapplicable com-
munications were privileged between a criminal defendant and a court-appointed psychiatrist);
Saucerman v. Saucerman, 170 Colo. 318, 461 P.2d 18 (1969) (recognizing a united privilege as to
communications with a court probation officer where public interest demands that the
confidentiality of the communication be preserved); but see Davidson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190,248 N.W.2d 433 (1977) where, pursuant to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.01 (West
1975) restricting recognition of privileges, any sought-after privilege, whether or not previously
recognized at common law, must be adopted either by state supreme court rule or by statutory
enactment before it may be given effect.
40 Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory auth-
ority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. In civil actions and
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which state law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law.
FED. R. Evm. 501 (emphasis added).
41 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EvIDENCE § 501-2 (1977).
42 Id.
43 Kattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Suggested Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613 (1976).
44 FED. R. EviD. 501; see Sterk, Testimonial Privileges: An Analysis of Horizontal Choice of
Law Problems, 61 MINN. L.R. 461 (1977) for a discussion of when state law should apply
regarding the issue of privilege in a federal court under Rule 501.
4' Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
41 See note 39 supra.
4' Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976). In striking
down a statute granting a newsperson a privilege as to his/her source, the supreme court stated
that privileges are strictly procedural.
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Thus, when confronted with the question of whether one is better served
by taking one's fight for a sought-after privilege not previously recognized to
the court or to the legislature, the following guidelines may prove helpful: (1)
in a federal court case with a federal question at issue, whether criminal or
civil in nature, the federal courts have congressionally granted authority to
evaluate the issue on a case-by-case basis, unrestricted by pre-existing
common law privileges or statutory enactments; (2) in any other federal court
case, the law of the appropriate state will apply; (3) in a case being decided in
a state court, there is little chance of the state court independently recognizing
a privilege which has not previously been recognized at common law or
provided for by statutory enactment. The single exception to this is the State
of New Mexico, the supreme court of which has held that the issue of
recognizing privileges is one which is to be left solely to the courts of the state
to decide, as it involves procedural rule and not substantive law.
The obvious conclusion is that any sought-after privilege is best
approached in terms of legislative resolution rather than court recognition.
Therefore, the ensuing review of current testimonial privileges and legal
analysis is directed toward legislative and not judicial reform.
B. Traditional Privileges
Of the testimonial privileges currently recognized, four are the most
common and widely accepted. With few exceptions, these four are
recognized either at common law, by statutory enactment, or by court rule in
every state.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
This privilege existed at common law as early as the sixteenth century. 4
However, unlike today, the theory for excluding testimony regarding
attorney-client communications was "point of honor", the focus being on
deference to the oath and honor of the attorney who had a duty to keep the
secrets of his clients.49 Eventually, the theory shifted to protect the client in
order that the client would remain uninhibited while consulting with his
attorney.,0 The belief is that justice is best served when each party to the
adversarial proceeding is effectively represented, and such effective
representation can occur only when the attorney has received the whole set of
facts from his client. Were the attorney to later be put in the position of using
these facts against the client, there would be a reluctance on the part of future
clients to fully disclose to their attorneys all the facts as they know them to be.
Although this privilege is not without criticism, 51 today the privilege is
recognized in all jurisdictions. 52 In most states the attorney-client privilege is
in statutory form and enjoys the broadest reach of all privileged com-
munications in that it has the fewest exceptions.53
4 8 J. WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at § 2291.
52 3 S. G~aD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 21:8 (6th ed. 1972).
' See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 940 (West 1966); N.Y. Crv. PPAc. LAw § 4503 (McKinney 1970);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(A) (Page Supp. 1977).
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2. Marital Privilege
This husband-wife privilege was enforced at common law on the theory
that the marital relationship was not to be jeopardized by testimony
compelled from one spouse against another regarding communications made
in confidence.5 4 Both the husband and wife are deemed to be holders of the
privilege and thus each can effectively veto the other's waiver of his or her
own privilege. 55 Most states have replaced the common law privilege with
statutory enactments56 which contain a number of exceptions to the
privilege.57
3. Physician-Patient Privilege
While there was no physician-patient privilege at common law, in 1828
the State of New York enacted a statute granting such a privilege and many
other states followed suit.5 8 The reason offered for establishing the privilege
was similar to that of the attorney-client privilege, a desire to insure full
disclosure by the patient so that the physician could perform his duties with
the aid of all the necessary information.5 9
Today the majority of states have enacted the physician-patient
privilege,60 but the number of exceptions and limitations have significantly
reduced the protection that the privilege might otherwise afford. 61 The
general trend is to grant the privilege in civil cases but not in criminal cases.
6 2
5 8 J. WIGMORF, EVIDENCE §§ 2333-34 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The author points out that the
marital privilege was for a time incorrectly confused with the incompetency rule which
precluded one from testifying against his/her spouse if such spouse was a party or had an interest
in the suit. The disqualification of the spouse as a witness is absolute notwithstanding a waiver by
the other spouse.
55 C. McCoRMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 83 (2d ed. 1972).
56 See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 970 (West 1966); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4502 (McKinney 1970);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(D) (Page Supp. 1977); butsee 3 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 21:3
(1972), where the author states that federal rules of evidence recognize no marital privilege in
civil cases.
57 The California code discusses the following exceptions: commitment or similar
proceedings; proceedings between spouses; certain criminal proceedings; juvenile court
proceedings; and communication offered by a spouse who is a criminal defendant. See CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 981-87 (West 1966).
58 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
" As noted in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 237 Mo. App. 464,172 S.W.2d 269 (1943), the
rationale for the privilege is that without the confidentiality it ensures, a patient might fail to make
full disclosure to a physician about his/her symptoms, thus inhibiting proper treatment.
60 Most of those states have enacted the privilege outright. However, some have implicitly
recognized a physician-patient privilege by statutorily providing for exceptions to it while not
explicitly enunciating the privilege. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1108 (West 1978).
11 Most states have provided for specific situations where the privilege is inapplicable.
Commonly, there is no physician-patient privilege in situations where either the patient has by
some act constructively waived the privilege, or a conflicting social policy is deemed of greater
importance than those which gave rise to the privilege. Thus, there may be no privilege where the
patient is suing the physician for malpractice, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973), has offered
himself or the physician as a witness to testify about his physical condition, HAW. REV. STAT. § 621-
20.5 (1976), or where the patient's physical condition is an element of his claim or defense, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West Supp. 1978); where the validity of a will, KAN. STAT. § 60-427
(1976), or a writing affecting an interest in property, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1001 (West 1966), is at
issue; where the patient has fraudulently obtained drugs from a physician, NEV. REV. STAT. §
49.245 (1973); where the trial is for homicide, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West 1975), or an insanity
plea has been entered, D.C. CODE § 14-307 (1973); in an incompetency hearing, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-22.3 (West 1976), or one for delinquency, D.C. CODE § 14-307 (1973); where there is a
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4. Clergyman-Penitent Privilege
There was no privilege for communications between a clergyman and
penitent at common law.63 However, most states have enacted statutes
protecting the communications between clergy and penitents.6 4 The rec-
ognition of the privilege is predicated on a perceived need to tolerate the
practice of religion by its citizens. This privilege was originally limited to
confessional communications, 65 but most statutes have extended the privilege
to communications made to spiritual advisors, even though not confessional in
nature, as long as the communicant intended them to be in confidence.6
C. Recent Extensions
The function of the testimonial privilege is to protect certain confidential
relationships which are deemed crucial to the perpetuation of the
community's social well-being. As society becomes more complex and
sophisticated, a variety of new relationships arise to meet the sociological,
psychological, and professional needs of its membership. The law has
adjusted to the changing times by willingly recognizing those new
relationships which render a valuable service to society. The following
relationships have been accorded protection to some degree by way of a
testimonial privilege.
1. Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege
There are relatively few states that have specific psychiatrist-client
privilege statutes,6 7 but this is because the majority of states have included the
psychiatrist within the definition of "physician" in their physician-client
statutes. 61 Still other states include the psychiatrist within the definition of
"psychotherapist," thereby providing protection by way of a psycho-
question of child abuse, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07 (West 1976); or where a crime or tort has
allegedly been committed, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.6 (West 1976).
12 California, Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming limit the privilege to civil cases;
Kansas also applies it to misdemeanor cases, KAN. STAT. § 60-427 (1976); anomalously, Arizona
limits its invocation to criminal cases, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4062 (1978).
63 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
64 C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 77 (2d ed. 1972).
65 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2395 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Although a distinct minority, a few
jurisdictions still explicitly require that the communication have been a confession. E.g., N.Y. Civ.
PaAc. LAW § 4505 (McKinney 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1953).
66 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.477 (West 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-2 (1953); On. REV.
STAT. § 44.040 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1963); see also Annot., 50 A.L.R.3D 563
(1973) for a discussion of the situation where the role of the clergy overlaps with the functions of
those engaged in social work. The issue is whether the privilege regarding one's role as a
clergyman will extend to communications made to him as he likewise operates in the capacity of a
social worker. The inverse issue may also be raised - whether communications made to a clergy
which fall outside the protection of the clergyman-penitent privilege are nonetheless protected
by the virtue of his/her functioning in the capacity of a social worker.
67 Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, and Kentucky specifically recognize a psychiatrist-patient
privilege. This privilege may be limited to civil actions, similar to that of physician and patient
communications. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146 (West 1979).
68 This inclusion is by implication other than specifically stated, as psychiatrists are by
definition licensed physicians, and most statutes extend the privilege to "doctors of medicine,"
persons authorized to practice "physic or surgery," or simply "physicians," without defining the
term. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page 1954); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (1963).
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therapist-client statute.6 9 Finally, in rare instances, some state courts have
recognized a psychotherapist privilege in the absence of any statutory
enactment, deriving the privilege from common law.7 °
The reasoning behind the psychiatrist-patient privilege is similar to the
reasoning which underlies the recognition of a privilege for other disciplines
specializing in mental diseases - the encouraging of open communications
by the patient in order that the psychiatrist might have sufficient relevant
information to effectuate the diagnosis and treatment of the mental disease.7'
However, this privilege is also subject to many of the same exceptions as the
general physician-patient privilege. 72
2. Psychologist-Client Privilege
A majority of states now recognize the psychologist-client privilege. Some
states have enacted a separate and distinct statute for the privilege, 7 while
other states define psychologist either within the psychotherapist privilege 74
or within the physician-patient privilege. 75
Those states granting a privilege to psychologists invariably have limited
the privilege to those psychologists who are registered and/or certified under
the state's licensing scheme.76 Some statutes can be broadly construed in favor
of the patient and some courts have viewed the privilege accordingly. 77 The
privilege is founded on the assumption that confidentiality is indispensable to
the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.
3. Clinical Social Worker-Client Privilege
Six states have enacted statutes creating a privilege as to communications
69 E.g., CAL. EvD. CODE § 1014 (West 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West Supp. 1978).
70 In State v. Evans, 104 Ariz. 434,454 P.2d 976 (1969), the Arizona Supreme Court deemed it
fundamentally unfair to allow the psychiatrist of an alleged rapist to testify about inculpatory
statements made by the defendant. However, this case is quite unique. See generaUy Annot., 44
A.L.R.3D 24 (1972).
71 In Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the court found a testimonial
privilege to be especially compelling in the case of psychiatrists because "[m]any physical
ailments might be treated with some degree of effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not
trust, but a psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot help him." Id. at 401.
7. Where psychiatrist privilege arises from licensure to practice medicine, the exceptions are
obviously applicable. However, even where statutorily enacted, similar limitations may be
imposed. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1016-1026 (West 1966).
73 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 26-2 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91
1/2, § 406 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MD. CTs. & JtD. Paoc. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8-53.3 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-25-9 (1953).
74 E.g., CAL. Evm. CODE § 1010 (West 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West Supp. 1978);
S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 19-13-7 (1979).
7- E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.225 (1973); VA. CODE 9 8.01-399 (1973) (clinical psychologist
only).
76 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 54-2314 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. 9 25-33-1-17 (Burns 1974); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:2366 (West 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-30-17 (1953); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.19
(Page 1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1117 (1976).
77 See Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 508 P.2d 309,107 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1973), where
the court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and the constitutional right to
privacy as the reason for liberally construing the privilege in favor of the patient. See also
Application of Queen, 233 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where the court also reached the result of
liberal construction but by using the model of attorney-client privilege.
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made to clinical social workers. 78 Additionally, one state court has held that
the psychotherapist privilege was a common law privilege and that it applied
to the field of psychiatric social work. 79 The statutory recognition of the social
worker privilege is part of a regulatory licensing scheme whereby the state has
set out to protect the client by restricting the practice of social work to those
who qualify under the statute.80 The definition of social work as provided
under the various state statutes is fairly detailed. For example, the Utah statute
defines social work as:
The professional activity of helping individuals, groups, or com-
munities enhance or restore their capacity for social functioning and
creating societal conditions favorable to this goal. Social work
practice consists of the professional application of social work
values, principles, and techniques to one or more of the following
ends: helping people obtain tangible services; counseling with
individuals, families, and groups; helping communities or groups
provide or improve social and health services; and participating in
relevant legislative processes. The practice of social work requires
knowledge of human development and behavior; of social,
economic, and cultural institutions; and of the interaction of all these
factors.81
Perhaps the most significant point regarding the social worker privilege is
that for the most part it offers protection to a class of clients who are
dependent upon state-supported facilities and state-employed staff. Because
these clients are in dire need of the services sought, and because they are not in
a financial position which would allow them to engage the services of a private
psychiatrist or psychologist (to whom communications made are privileged),
the privilege removes a barrier to open communications that might otherwise
thwart the servicing of the client's needs.82
4. Teacher-Student Privilege
Six states have to some degree or another recognized a privilege regarding
communications made by students to teachers.8s Some state statutes extend
the privilege to all communications that are made in confidence, 84 while
others limit the privilege to communications concerning alcohol or drug
71 CAL. Evim. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213 (Supp. 1977); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37-2714 (West 1974); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 338.1764 (Supp. 1977-78) N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10 (1974).
79 Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alas. 1976).
'0 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-1 (1974).
1l Id. at § 58-35-3(2).
82 For a discussion of this point, see Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension
of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CAL. L. REV.
1050 (1973).
83 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-154(A) (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.216
(Supp. 1978-79); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-115
(West 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1319 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
s4 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2165 (Supp. 1978-79).
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abuse.8 5 Usually, the student is the holder of the privilege and disclosure is
prohibited absent a waiver by the student, or his parent or legal guardian if he
has not attained majority.8 6 However, in the State of Connecticut, disclosure is
left to the teacher's discretion.87 In three other states, there are statutory
enactments creating a privilege for communications by a student to his school
counselor. ss This privilege does not extend to a teacher unless the teacher is
designated to perform the function of counselor by the school administration
and is acting in that capacity. These privileges are aimed at encouraging
students to share their personal problems with their teachers and counselors in
the hope that the latter may assist the student in constructively dealing with
his/her problems.
5. Accountant-Client Privilege
There are sixteen states which have statutes providing for protection of the
communications between a client and his accountant via a testimonial
privilege.8 9 Some of the statutory provisions limit the privilege to certified
public accountants," while others include a wide range of personnel acting in
the professional capacity of accountant as permitted by state law.91 In
addition, there are significant variances among the statutes regarding the
extent of the privilege. The various statutes are classified as broad, typical or
narrow.9 2 The four "broad" statutes 93 require only that the communications
be made in confidence. The "typical" statutes94 restrict the reach of the
85 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-154(A) (West Supp. 1979).
86 See note 84 supra.
87 See note 85 supra.
88 IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1977); N .C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.4 (Supp. 1977); N.C. CENT. CODE §
31-01-06.1 (1976).
s9 AnIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-749 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(f) (1973); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 473.741 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110
1/2, § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-2-1-23 (Burns 1974); IowA CODE § 116.15 (1971);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325.440 (Baldwin 1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.85 (West 1974); MD. Crs.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-110 (1974); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 338.523 (Supp. 1977-78); Mo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 326.151 (Vernon Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.125-205 (1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
20-1-12(c) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 64, § 9.11a (Purdon Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
62-143 (1976).
80 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(f) (1973).
1' Typical of this broad categorization is the Pennsylvania statute, which includes:
a certified public accountant, public accountant, partnership or corporation,
holding a permit to practice under this act, or a person employed by a certified public
accountant, public accountant, partnership, or a director of or a person employed by a
professional corporation holding a permit to practice under this act, or an associate of or
a person employed by a professional association holding a permit to practice under this
act ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.11a (Purdon Supp. 1977).
92 Jentz, Accountant Privileged Communications: Is it a Dying Concept Under the New
Federal Rules of Evidence?, 11 Am. Bus. L.J. 149 (1973).
93 GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216 (1970) (note that under this statute, communications made to an
accountant in expectation of engaging his services are assumed to be confidential); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §325.440 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1-12(c) (Supp. 1975).
94 The states having "typical" statutes are: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, and Tennessee. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2165 (Supp. 1978-79).
[Vol. 27:565
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss4/17
HALFWAY HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS
testimonial privilege to those communications made to the accountant in the
course of his professional employment, and in addition provide one or more
of the following limitations: "(1) that invocation of the privilege can be
waived by the client; (2) that the privilege does not apply in criminal or
bankruptcy proceedings; (3) that the privilege can be waived when the
information is material to the defense of an action against the accountant.
'
"
95
Pennsylvania is the sole state that has a "narrow" statute. In addition to all of
the restrictions and limitations found in the "typical" statutes, the Penn-
sylvania provision precludes assertion of the privilege by the accountant
against third persons who have relied on the accountant's audit, or when the
audit is at issue in an action wherein the accountant is a party.9
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not include a recognition of the
accountant-client privilege. Consequently in both criminal and federal
question cases, the federal courts are not required to recognize a privilege in
this area. However, in non-federal question, civil cases, the privilege will be
recognized if, under conflict of law principles, the apposite state law provides
for the testimonial privilege.97
The policy basis for recognizing an accountant-client privilege is based on
the sophisticated nature of modern day bookkeeping. The need for the
professional services of an accountant is crucial, and full disclosure to the
accountant is equally necessary in order that the product of the accountant
accurately reflect the true financial picture of the client. 9
6. Drug Rehabilitation Programs: Staff-Client Privilege
A number of states have statutes which authorize and/or regulate drug
rehabilitation programs designed to constructively deal with society's drug
abuse problem. Ten states have incorporated provisions which insure the
confidentiality of the records and/or communications of the clients of such
programs.9  While all except the Tennessee enactment extend the privilege to
communications as well as records kept, two states do allow disclosure of the
communications and/or records upon a showing of good cause to a court. 10
Although most of the states limit the privilege to those communications which
concern the treatment or rehabilitation of drug-dependent clients,1 1 a
Georgia statute extends the privilege to an authorized employee of a licensed
95 Jentz, supra note 92, at 153.
'6 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 9.11a (Purdon 1978-79).
17 For a discussion of the forum shopping problem that arises in these circumstances, plus
consideration of the positive and negative aspects of the accountant-client privilege, see Note,
Evidence: The Accountant-Client Privilege Under the New Federal Rules of Evidence - New
Stature and New Problems, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 637, 645-48 (1975).
91 Id. at 647.
99 GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418 (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43B, § 22 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 318-B 12-a (Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-10-12 (Supp. 1975); Onio REV. CODE ANN. §
5122.53 (Page Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 657 (West Supp. 1978-79); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 1690.108 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-813 (1977); TEX. CRIM. PRO.
CODE ANN. tit. 38, § 101 (Vernon Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51-30 (West Supp. 1978-79).
100 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1690.108 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-813 (1977).
101 States having statutes with such limitations are Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin.
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program.10 2 An additional distinction is found in an Ohio statute which
provides that a patient of a program who is there as a condition of probation
or parole, or in lieu of conviction, is deemed to have consented to the release
of records and information relating to treatment, and, if the patient refuses to
allow disclosure, he will be deemed in violation of his probation, parole or
preconviction disposition agreement.1 0 3
This privilege is premised on the notion that society's interest in
encouraging the therapeutic process of these drug programs outweighs
society's interest in having access to potential evidence.
III. EXTENSION OF THE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE TO HALFWAY HOUSE STAFF-
RESIDENT COMMUNICATIONS
Having reviewed the current status of the law regarding testimonial
privileges, and having reviewed the historical development of the correc-
tional halfway house to its present state, it is necessary to address the issue of
whether a testimonial privilege for halfway house staff-resident communica-
tion is legally appropriate. In doing so, the analysis will focus on applying
Wigmore's four canons to the relationship in question (in the context of the
Kenney decision), comparing the staff-resident relationship with other
relationships protected under the law, and examining the treatment and
rehabilitation theory as it relates to the right of privacy.
A. Applying Wigmore's Test Against the Kenney Backdrop
Any privilege, whether statutory or otherwise, must meet the conditions of
the four canons set forth by Professor Wigmore.104 In Kenney, the defendant
argued that Wigmore's four conditions had indeed been met. Kenney
contended that:
(1) The staff of the halfway house had given the residents the
assurance that any communication made in confidence to their
counselors or advisors would be kept confidential.
(2) If communications made by the residents of the halfway house
are not kept confidential and are subject to disclosure in a criminal
proceeding, the residents will not confide in the staff and the
therapeutic process of the program will be destroyed.
(3) There is a strong public interest in the rehabilitation of offenders
as evidenced by the growing number of community-based
correctional programs in addition to the extensive utilization of
rehabilitative programs in state correctional institutions. The staff-
resident interaction being the foundation of these rehabilitative
programs, it follows that it would be in the public interest to protect
such interaction.
(5) . . . If clients of a rehabilitation program know that their
102 GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6319 (1975).
103 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.53(C) (Page Supp. 1977).
104 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:565
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol27/iss4/17
HALFWAY HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS
disclosure will be used against them in a criminal proceeding, they
will refrain from making such disclosures.'05
While the Kenney court did not specifically address Wigmore's test in its
opinion, the defendant's argument regarding these canons was implicitly
rejected. The court observed:
A project such as a halfway house is organized for the purpose of
protecting society through rehabilitation of the offender. Where that
offender violates a law designated as a serious crime by the
prescribed penalty, his communication of such fact to the director
must bow to the public need to ferret out the truth so as to protect
itself. 06
The question not answered is how a project such as a halfway house -
organized for the purpose of protecting society through rehabilitation - can
protect society if the means by which it is to do so (i.e., the rehabilitative
process) is rendered useless, because disclosure is compelled in the interest of
the protection of society. The Kenney decision must be interpreted as
meaning that society is better protected by a single disclosure in the pursuit of
the administration of justice than it is by the ongoing rehabilitation of the
many residents - both present and future - who are a part of the
correctional halfway house programs in operation today.
Since the Kenney decision was rendered, the defendant's assertion that the
conditions of Wigmore's canons had been met has only been strengthened.
The findings of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice reveal that the halfway house program may serve to benefit the public
both in terms of economics and rehabilitation.0 7 Furthermore, the increasing
rate at which communities become involved in implementing correctional
halfway houses serves to further support the contention that the relationship
between the staff and the residents is one which ought to be sedulously
fostered. 0
B. Comparing the Staff-Resident Relationship with Other
Relationships Protected Under the Law
Perhaps the strongest argument against extending the testimonial privilege
to halfway house staff-resident communications is that some or all of the
critical staff members may lack the professional credentials historically
presumed to be a prerequisite necessary to deem a relationship worthy of
legal protection. 10 9 With the exception of the marital privilege,110 every
105 Brief for defendant at 4-5, Kansas v. Kenney, No. 2668 (D. Kan. May 7,1974). Filed with the
defendant's brief was a letter from the International Halfway House Association which proffered
the organization's support to the Manhattan House and Kenney in their effort to persuade the
court to recognize the communications between halfway house staff members and residents as
privileged.
106 Kansas v. Kenney, No. 2668 (D. Kan. May 23, 1974).
107 SErrER, supra note 5, at ix, 35.
108 Id. at 1. The report indicates that community security and property values have generally
been unaffected by the presence of a halfway house nearby. Id. at 33.
109 Critical staff members include those whose functions are directly related to the
rehabilitative process, viz., the director, the assistant director, and the counselors.
110 See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
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statutorily protected relationship involves practicing professionals of a
recognized academic discipline who hold advanced degrees in their
respective fields. Additionally, some states granting a testimonial privilege
require the professional involved to be either certified or licensed by the
state."' These statutory requirements are designed to ensure that a person
dispensing these professional services is both competent and responsible, and
thereby deserving of the public trust which underlies the legal protection
afforded his profession.
Unfortunately, the nature of the halfway house program realistically
precludes the critical staff members of such a program from meeting the
statutory standards of any presently protected professional relationship. This
is because the rehabilitative model used in a halfway house program
necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach which requires the critical staff
member to function as a "jack of all trades"; he must be competent in all areas
but not necessarily a master of any." 2 Consequently, to provide socio-
psychological, financial, vocational, educational and drug counseling, it is
necessary for the critical staff members to act in a collective capacity not
unlike that of a social worker, a psychologist, an accountant, a clergyman, a
teacher, and a drug counselor. It would be unrealistic, from an academic
standpoint, to expect a single critical staff member to possess all of these
credentials as required by each respective discipline in order that he may
qualify for the testimonial protection afforded to professionals of these
various disciplines. Keeping in mind the critical staff-resident ratio of a typical
program," 3 it is economically unrealistic to expect that all critical staff
members of a halfway house program would individually hold the statutorily
required credentials of any single privileged discipline which would be of a
practical value in protecting generally the confidential communications
between that staff member and a resident. 1 4
It should be emphasized that although the halfway house is distinguishable
from a majority of the presently protected professional relationships, because
it offers the resident a full spectrum of counseling services in the context of a
live-in environment, the services provided are essentially the same.
The same rationale that is repeatedly enunciated in justifying the grant of a
testimonial privilege to those presently protected relationships is likewise
applicable to the staff-resident relationship in the halfway house setting.
Specifically, the privilege serves to remove a barrier to open communications
that might otherwise thwart the servicing of the resident's needs. The barrier
"I See, e.g., Ono REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.19 (Page Supp. 1978).
112 For descriptions of the academic qualifications recommended for the various critical staff
members, see J. MCCAnTr & T. MANCOCNA, supra note 2, at 173-98.
113 Generally there is one staff member for every five residents. See D. THALHEIMER, supra note
16, at 8-9.
114 Although it is true that an individual possessing the statutorily required credentials of a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or certified social worker would be entitled to a much broader
protection regarding confidential communications in the halfway house setting, considering the
pay scale of halfway house directors, there is a likelihood that even that position would be difficult
to fill with a person holding such credentials. A 1975 study showed the director's annual average
low salary to be $12,085 and the annual average high salary to be $15,970. The salaries of assistant
directors and counselors were found to be even less. See id. at 9.
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may be a fear by the resident of a loss of personal privacy or exposure to
criminal prosecution. Thus the inhibitions of the resident are not unlike those
experienced by persons who seek counseling from specialists of the presently
protected professions.
Generally, the residents of a correctional halfway house program are
financially unable to secure the needed counseling services on their own.
Consequently, the argument advanced on behalf of those dependent upon the
services of a social worker 15 is equally applicable to the halfway house
resident. The resident should not be denied the protection presently provided
to the clients of the professionals in the private sector merely because he or she
cannot afford the "purchase price" of the services of such professionals.
It is not the author's intent to suggest that the skills of the critical staff
members are of the same caliber as those of professionals who specialize in
the various medical, psychiatric, sociological, and educational services which
are currently provided with legal protection. However, the distinction as to
the level of expertise should not operate as a basis for denying the grant of a
testimonial privilege inasmuch as the target population of the correctional
halfway house program is such that the higher level of expertise is not
required. Notably, a review of the typical selection criteria adopted by the
resident screening committee of halfway house programs shows that those
offenders who need the treatment of a specialist are denied admission.1 ,
The Guidelines and Standards published by the United States Department
of Justice set out detailed intake procedures and policies which are intended
to limit the halfway house population to those offenders whose personal needs
can be attended within the framework of the halfway house setting. 117 Those
who demonstrate a pattern of violence; those who are significantly mentally
retarded (I.Q. of 70 or below); those who are psychotic; those who are
currently addicted to drugs; and those who manifest deviant sexual behavior
are as a matter of policy automatically denied admission. 18 Therefore, the
degree of expertise necessary to deal with individuals who suffer severe
emotional, physical, or mental disturbance is not required of halfway house
personnel. Also, the halfway house program has at its disposal a number of
community resource persons, qualified experts in their respective fields, who
make themselves available to the halfway house staff on a consultation basis,
as well as meeting one-on-one with the residents when the situation dictates.
This supervision, along with the carefully defined selection process, operates
to ensure that the critical staff members are dispersing their services both
competently and responsibly.
The Commission for Accreditation for Corrections has undertaken the
process of accrediting a number of halfway house programs. Inasmuch as the
Federal Bureau of Prisons has indicated that such accreditation will be
necessary for referrals and funding, a similar approach could be taken by a
15 See notes 78-82 supra and accompanying text.
116 Each prospective resident's history is reviewed by a screening committee, comprised of
staff members, members of the house's board of directors, and various other professionals.
117 J. McCAR-r & T. MANCOCNA, supra note 2, at 136-41.
"' Available to the house's screening committee are the results of a battery of diagnostic tests
performed on the prospective resident, as well as a social history of the individual and other
valuable data. Id. at 136-37.
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state legislature regarding the extension of the testimonial privilege to the
halfway house setting. This statutory requirement of accreditation could be
used instead of the licensing and certification procedures adopted for the
legally protected professions. 1 9
C. Right to Privacy
The real importance of the testimonial privilege in the correctional
halfway house context is founded in the protection it affords the resident's
right to privacy, notwithstanding the protection it may afford a resident
regarding the compelled disclosure of incriminating communications made
to a staff member. This is (1) because the resident's privacy, entailing the
voluntary and secure control he holds over communication of information
about himself,1 20 is an essential element in the development of a positive
relationship with the staff members as well as fellow residents, and (2)
because recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the right to privacy
appear to leave little hope that this right will receive absolute constitutional
protection. 121
1. Privacy and the Staff-Resident Relationship
It may safely be stated that regardless of which treatment model is used,
the staff-resident interactions are designed as a catalyst for positive self-
change on the part of the resident. This interaction often takes the form of
personal and private communications between the resident and a staff
member. It is in this setting of privacy that expressions of trust are exchanged
and constructive relationships are formed. As long as the resident has a right to
privacy and a voluntary and secure control over the communication of his
personal beliefs, ideas, values, fears, and hopes, he has the means by which to
select what he wishes to share, and with whom. It is the right to privacy that
provides the resident with a choice regarding the staff-resident relationship,
without which the relationship could not exist. 122
2. Right to Privacy Not Absolute
Although all private communications, as well as evidence integrally
related to private, individual rights or interests recognized by the Supreme
Court as fundamental, come within the protection of the Constitution, l23
recent decisions have rejected any notion of an absolute right to privacy under
the fourth and fifth amendments.
In Fisher v. United States 24 the Court, relying heavily on a prior decision
19 Alternatively, a state could develop its own accreditation scheme if it so desired in order to
exercise some regulatory control over the correctional halfway houses operating within its
boundaries.
120 Krattenmaker, supra note 43, at 649.
121 See notes 124 and 125 infra and accompanying text.
122 See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1967-68).
in3 Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 988 (1977).
124 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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in Couch v. United States,12 5 held that a summons directing a third party to
surrender the defendant's private papers would not violate the fifth
amendment because of the lack of compulsion against the accused himself.
126
The consequence of the Fisher decision is that unless a relationship is
recognized as privileged by statute or the common law, a third person (such as
a halfway house staff member) cannot avoid complying with a valid subpoena
requiring the production of private papers and recollections of private
communications involving the accused (a halfway house resident) because of
a lack of compulsion against the accused himself. 1 7 Given the Court's present
position, "that all individual claims to right are relative to other societal
interests,"'' 21 the only practical solution to the problem of protecting the
privacy right of the residents of a correctional halfway house program is the
granting of a testimonial privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
The testimonial privilege renders a valuable service to society by
protecting a variety of relationships which evolve to meet the sociological,
psychological, and professional needs of its members. To date, no such
privilege has been extended to afford protection to the confidential
communications of the correctional halfway house staff and residents. The
author has proposed specific legal and policy arguments to support his
contention that such a testimonial privilege is both necessary and legally
appropriate. Given the reluctance of state courts to independently recognize a
confidential communication between halfway house staff members and
residents as privileged, it appears the issue is best resolved by the legislative
body.
RICHARD KENNEY
125 409 U.S. 322 (1973). The Couch decision prompted much discussion in the literature. See,
e.g., Note, Couch v. United States - Protection of Taxpayers' Records, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 810
(1973-74); 1 FLA. ST. L. REV. 506 (1973); 62 Ky. L.J. 263 (1973-74); 1973 UTAH L. REV. 106.
126 425 U.S. at 396-98. For an in-depth consideration of the Fisher decision, see Note, Fifth
Amendment Protection Against Self-Incrimination in Tax Records: Fisher v. United States, 30
Sw. L.J. 788 (1976).
127 Note, supra note 123, at 979.
121 Id. at 985.
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